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Abstract 
This paper defends the resilience of the concept of public law in the context of 
privatization on the one hand and globalization on the other. National identity and its 
relationship to public law can be situated in the context of each of these processes of 
change, but the highly particular relationship between the nation and the state which 
emerged with the modern, classical form of public law is in many ways a discrete 
concern, not unaffected by privatization or globalization, but sufficiently robust to 
remain the central dynamic in legitimising democratic rule today. Although the 
relationship between a people and its polity is inevitably affected by normative 
developments beyond the state and by the arguably diminishing public space within it, 
there is also and perhaps paradoxically considerable evidence pointing to the 
resilience of national identities and the power of states; trends which challenge the 
early 21st century prognosis that we have entered a post-national era. The primary 
focus of the paper is upon the ‘resilient functionalism’ of public law in continuing to 
support the important relationship between the nation and the state. It begins by 
outlining the functionalism of public law in its broadest sense, tracing its historical 
development as a discrete subject. Secondly, it explores further how public law’s 
primary role in the modern era has been to facilitate the relationship between national 
identity and the state. And thirdly, it offers empirical evidence to defend the 
‘resilience thesis’ and the ongoing importance of public law as facilitator of the 
continuing, albeit changing, relationship, between nation, national identity and state. 
 
Keywords 
Law; Public law; constitutional law; privatization; globalization; nation; nation-state; 
national identity; nationalism; state; post-national; resilient functionalism; 
functionalism; constitution; constitutionalism; sovereignty; post-sovereign; popular 
sovereignty; referendums; democracy; direct democracy; plurinational states; 
multinational states. 
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The Nation as ‘the Public’: the resilient functionalism of public law 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The notion that the age of public law has somehow passed or is passing recalls 
persistent claims that the age of the nation state and the nation itself is also drawing to 
a close. I have elsewhere argued that these latter claims are over-stated
1
, and in this 
chapter I will challenge the notion that somehow the role for public law is likewise 
being undermined. In doing so I will draw parallels between both sets of claims and in 
turn will suggest that the resilience of both the nation and public law is, through the 
functional role the latter serves, in fact relational. 
 
I will address the resilience of the concept of public law in the context of privatization 
on the one hand and globalization on the other. The former, for our purposes, has 
involved the hollowing out of the public sphere and the concomitant diminution of the 
role of the state in regulating areas of private activity, particularly in the economic 
arena; the latter is an increasingly inchoate term, but again for the legal theorist it 
refers to those new transnational normative structures which challenge, and in some 
ways already supplant, the state’s authority from the outside. National identity and its 
relationship to public law can be situated in the context of each of these processes of 
change, but the highly particular relationship between the nation and the state which 
emerged with the modern, classical form of public law, must be presented as in many 
ways a discrete concern, not unaffected by privatization or globalization, and yet also 
sufficiently robust and distinctive to raise specific issues for how we understand 
public law and its continuing relevance and resilience today. My concern in this 
chapter is to re-emphasise the extent to which ties of identification and loyalty 
between a people – and in some cases a number of peoples – and the constitutional 
order and public law system of a particular polity remain strong, as in many respects 
do the states themselves which host these ties, and that ‘classical’ systems of public 
law therefore remain central in managing these polities. Although the relationship 
between a people and its polity is inevitably affected by changing dynamics beyond 
the state and by the arguably diminishing public space within it, there is also and 
perhaps paradoxically considerable evidence pointing to the resilience of national 
identities and the power of states; dynamics which challenge the early 21st century 
prognosis that we have entered a post-national era.  
 
This argument for the resilience of the nation–state nexus leads me to situate the 
chapter within ‘the domain of public law’. The introductory chapter to this collection 
adopts this term in calling for reflection on the point and worth of the ethical and 
political project that public law embodies. And here my primary focus will be upon 
the functionalism or what I will call the ‘resilient functionalism’ of public law in 
continuing to support the important relationship between nations and states. I will 
begin by outlining what I understand by the functionalism of public law in its broadest 
sense, tracing very briefly its historical development as a discrete subject. Secondly I 
will explore further how public law’s primary function in the modern era has been to 
facilitate the relationship between national identity and the state. And thirdly, I will 
                                                        
 Stephen Tierney, Professor of Constitutional Theory, School of Law, University of Edinburgh 
1 S Tierney, Constitutional Law and National Pluralism (Oxford, OUP, 2004). 
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offer empirical evidence to defend the ‘resilience thesis’ and the ongoing importance 
of public law as facilitator of the continuing, albeit changing, relationship, between 
nation, national identity and state. 
  
II. Nation – state: the functionalism of public law 
 
The resourcefulness of public law is to be found in its functional role as a form of 
practice per Loughlin’s ‘broad conception of public law as one that encompasses all 
the rules, principles, habits and practices that sustain the autonomy of the world of the 
political’.2 Public law in this sense is the husbanding of public power, but it is not a 
process that does or can insulate public power from political forces. This political 
functionalism of public law leads us to two important implications for the purposes of 
this book. The first is that as a form of practice, public law is a product of lived, 
historical experience. It is in this sense bound up with the political reality of power. 
Where public power exists in whatever form, then a system of public law will 
invariably emerge to facilitate and regulate it, and so public law as a form of 
management of public power has ancient origins. Although the modernist 
functionalism of public law as we understand it today is bound up with the birth of the 
nation-state, the management of public power itself long predates this. With the 
development of social organisation beyond the tribe there has been some 
conceptualisation of a public that is abstracted from the bonds of kinship; the sphere – 
however articulated – that transcends private relations. And indeed a notion of the 
public, albeit very different from our modern conception, has thus been identified in 
the ancient world.
3
 And with this abstraction has come the need for a society to 
manage the power exercised therein; in short we might say, so long as there is a 
public sphere there will be public law. 
 
The second implication is that public law adapts to the particular functions it needs to 
perform. Public power manifests itself in different ways and so too does public law 
from time to time and place to place. I use the term ‘managing’ public power because 
this connotes two separate but related functions which, acting symbiotically but also 
in tension one with the other, continue to define the role of public law: facilitation and 
restraint. This dual and at times Janus-faced functionalism of public law has provided 
the environment for the prudent exercise of public power, while also controlling 
excesses committed in its name;
4
 in other words, public law offers us a vision of 
public power as both a promise and a threat, varying in form by these markers from 
system to system.
5
  
 
                                                        
2 M Loughlin, ‘Towards a Republican Revival?’ (2006) 26 OJLS 425, 436. 
3 A Lanni and A Vermeule, Constitutional Design in the Ancient World (January 24, 2011). Stanford 
Law Review, Forthcoming; Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 11-06. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1747087 accessed 16 January 2012; R C Van Caenegem, An Historical 
Introduction to Western Constitutional Law (Cambridge, CUP, 1995), Introduction. 
4 C Harlow and R Rawlings, ‘Red and Green Light Theories’, in Law and Administration, Third 
Edition (Cambridge, CUP, 2009), 1-48. 
5 One of the fascinating while frustrating features of our discipline is its propensity to throw paradoxes 
at us; the imperfect world of public law as political praxis leaves us with loose ends that are only 
avoidable in the ideal world of normative political theory. In many ways this is a premise, and implied 
by the title, of a recent important collection: M Loughlin and N Walker eds., The Paradox of 
Constitutionalism (Oxford, OUP, 2007). 
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Understood then as a tool of management other things flow, in particular the 
institutional structure for power management. And here through our modernist lens 
we locate the state, emerging in the late middle ages and maturing in the nineteenth 
century. The state is both itself the pre-eminent institutional form embodying the 
higher order legal norm that somehow sustains its own sovereignty
6
 and at the same 
time the receptacle for governmental institutions which generate second order norms. 
And with the establishment of institutions of government suitable for managing a 
large polity has come the delineation of the myriad ancillary functions that need to be 
performed by the state: representation, legislation, government, responsibility, 
adjudication etc. And accordingly, so too have been developed doctrines that manage 
relations among those institutions – separation of powers, checks and balances, rule of 
law; the legal concept of citizenship to establish the boundaries and qualification for 
individual membership and non-membership in the polity; and the establishment of a 
concept of hierarchy of laws from the ordinary to the constitutional to provide an 
internal circle of authority establishing legal authority, finality but also adaptability. 
 
Therefore, the modernist or classical model of public law with which we deal today 
has been tailored to suit the social conditions which themselves brought about the 
state: the imperial accretion of territory and the consolidation of the membership, 
identity and loyalty of disparate peoples brought together by this process; in a more 
economically determinist take Laski argued constitutional law is only meaningful 
when understood as the expression of an economic system of which it was designed to 
serve as a rampart.
7
 But crucially for this book it is the insight that we can only 
understand public law by the political function it performs that also inspires the idea 
that our age is somehow ‘after public law’ or approaching such a condition. As the 
legal competence of the state as unitary and omnipotent receptacle of sovereignty is 
constricted by new competences beyond the state and the diminishing capacity of 
statal public institutions in the face of lateral privatisation, then the function of public 
law as tool of state management is, it seems, diminishing. And there is no doubt that 
the state, at least in much of Europe, has lost and continues to lose much of its 
formerly exclusive normative purchase as public functions move to supra-state 
institutions where they must be managed in concert with others. We must not lose 
sight of the point that while public law is, given the nature of its function, in a sense 
timeless, its instantiation and the specific purposes it serves, has varied from time to 
time and place to place. And it is its inherently political dynamic that now leads me in 
the next section to extrapolate to the link between state and nation in the modernist 
manifestation of public law and in due course to an account of public law’s resilient 
functionalism in the face of a seemingly linear trend to a post-state and post-public 
law world. 
 
III. A Function of Modern Public Law: the nation and its identity  
 
The state has emerged to govern large numbers of people and the normative resource 
it has called upon to facilitate this is the politico-legal hybrid, sovereignty. But it is 
one thing to assert sovereignty; a particular task of the state has been to foster bonds 
of loyalty among its members both to the state and to its governmental institutions, 
without which sovereignty would be considerably harder to sustain. A key device in 
                                                        
6 J Elster, ‘Constitutional bootstrapping in Paris and Philadelphia’, (1992-93) 14 Cardozo Law Journal 
549. 
7 H Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London, Allen and Unwin, 1925) 578. 
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producing these bonds has been the somewhat inchoate notion of national identity. At 
one level sovereignty can be viewed as the monopoly over the control and application 
of public power. But sovereignty is misconceived if it is presented only as over-
whelming authority by the state over the people in the Hobbesian sense.  
 
Here Kalyvas reminds us that we should think of sovereignty as legitimiser as well as 
sovereignty as power in his distinction between ‘command sovereignty’ and 
‘constituent sovereignty’.8 The former is the classical model of the final word, central 
to modernist accounts of the legal system as Rechtsstaat. Within the Westphalian 
tradition of state-building, as conceptualised by Kelsen and Hart, it is considered that 
any legal order must have an absolute and final arbiter, and hence the sovereign is 
characterised, for example by de Spinoza, as he who ‘has the sovereign right of 
imposing any commands he pleases’.9 Constituent sovereignty, however, is for 
Kalyvas a neglected model which is concerned not with ‘coercive power’ but rather 
‘constituting power’: ‘Thus, contrary to the paradigm of the sovereign command that 
invites personification and can better be exercised by an individual who represents 
and embodies the unity of authority – from the ancient imperatore to the king to the 
modern executive – the constituent power points at the collective, intersubjective, and 
impersonal attributes of sovereignty, at its cooperative, public dimension.’10 This 
involves seeing the sovereign as ‘constituent subject’, as the one who shapes not only 
the governmental structure of a community but also its juridical and political 
identity;
11
 in other words, as the source of the constitution and of its authority. 
 
This mirrors the two-dimensional aspect of public law as both facilitator of and 
limitation to the exercise of public power. Sovereignty as the ultimate source of 
authority for public law facilitates its voluntary, popular feature alongside its coercive 
dynamic. It is not simply something to be borne out of sufferance, coercion being the 
unfortunate side-effect of the benefits accruing from the modern state. It is also the 
life-blood of the polity which gives it its popular impetus and which makes the life 
lived as a public actor and citizen rewarding and enhancing. The state can be a res 
publicae – genuinely a thing of the public – within which the public has the power to 
create, and indeed constantly recreate, the state in its own image.  
 
Thus the key feature upon which the modern functionalism of public law has come to 
rely is legitimacy, and this notion has been shaped by a growing association between 
the modern state on the one hand and democracy, defined as popular government and 
even popular sovereignty, on the other. Sovereignty in the modern era has come to 
rest upon consent, the rule of the people over the state mirroring authority by the state 
over the people. And it is in the context of democracy’s emergence as the dominant 
ideology of state legitimacy that we need to situate also the link between public law 
and national identity, which is crucial also to appreciating how modernist sovereignty 
has developed its double-sided character. 
 
Since a vital task of the modern state has been to legitimise its claim to a monopoly in 
the management of public power, and since in doing so by any means short of 
                                                        
8 A Kalyvas, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy and Constituent Power’ (2005) 12 Constellations 223, 
224. 
9 B de Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatise, tr. R.H.M. Elwes (New York, Dover, 1951) 207.  
10 Kalyvas op cit 235-236. 
11 Kalyvas op cit 226.  
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absolute dictatorship it has needed to find a way to harness the identity and loyalty of 
its subjects, the resource adapted to this task more than any other is the concept of the 
nation.
12
 This idea is vast in its complexity as recent decades of intense academic 
interest have illustrated. At the first order level, what is the nation? Is it simply a 
synonym for the people of a particular state, as we see it constructed within classical 
French constitutionalism? Or must we disentangle the concept of nation from the state 
and consider it to manifest itself in more organic sociological terms, at some level of 
detachment from the institutional construction of the polity? But when we move 
beyond the perfect mapping of state to nation, looking for a meaning of the latter in 
sociological terms it is clear that consensus on what constitutes a nation is impossible 
to find; as seen for example in international law’s failure to define the term ‘national 
minority’.13  
 
Among sociologists, the key debate takes place upon the spectrum of instrumentalism, 
with the nation considered to be more or less the instrumental outcome of other social 
phenomena. At one end of this spectrum the nation is the functional creation of the 
state. This is a form of modernist thinking which we find for example among Marxist 
thinkers like Hobsbawm.
14
 The nation as a vehicle for collective identity has little or 
no self-generated life of its own. It is contingent upon the functioning of the polity 
which it supports and just as it was manufactured to support the modern capitalist 
state so too would it disappear as it ceased to serve such any useful function, 
supplanted as many Marxists supposed by the triumph of a particular internationalised 
social class. At the other extreme are what we might call the ethno-essentialists who 
consider the nation to be deep-rooted in largely immutable social attachments built up 
through shared experiences over centuries and founded at least in part upon inherent 
markers of ethnic particularity; in other words political institutions emerged to serve 
rather than to shape the nation and could not of themselves either create or transform 
the structure of the nation in any meaningful way.  
 
Much of the literature within nationalism studies since the 1960s has tended to try and 
make sense of some middle ground, offering a variety of alternative accounts
15
 that 
seek to grasp the modernism, instrumentalism and contingency of nationalism which 
has made it a particularly useful ideological vehicle for the large-scale state, while 
recognising also that individual states constructed nations upon sites of identity which 
did in many cases pre-date the state; in other words the modern state appropriated 
more or less these older attachments together with the languages and cultures that had 
developed within nascent national communities, adapting and consolidating these 
identities to suit an emerging constitutional identity for the large-scale polity. The 
                                                        
12 E J Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The modernization of rural France, 1870-1914 (London : 
Chatto and Windus, 1977) 
13 No international instrument even those which expressly address minority rights attempts such a 
definition. 
14 EJ Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848 (London, Abacus, 1962); Nations and 
Nationalism Since 1780: programme, myth, reality (Cambridge, CUP, 1991). 
15 M Billig, Banal Nationalism (London, Sage, 1995); J Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2nd edn. 
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993); R Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood 
and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge, CUP, 1996); E Gellner, Nations and 
Nationalism (Oxford, Blackwell, 1983); T Nairn, Faces of Nationalism: Janus revisited (London, 
Verso, 1997); and A D Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1995). 
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nation was instrumentally useful and in some cases had indeed been ‘forged’,16 but it 
has also relied upon cultural and ethnic markers that pre-dated the state it was adapted 
to serve. Particular nations therefore can be situated on a scale moving from the more 
manufactured or ‘imagined’17 to those which built more upon pre-existing identity 
patterns. But this scale is more or less not either/or; each nation to differing extents 
and in differing ways combine attributes that on the one hand pre-date the nation-
building dynamic of modernism and the on the other have been shaped by the 
institutional structures and ideologies this dynamic brought with it. 
 
Therefore, the important work that has formed our contemporary understanding of the 
complexity of the nation is that which, particularly in the ground-breaking efforts of 
Anthony Smith, offers a nuanced and complex account, calling into question any 
essentialist vision of the nation as inherently ethnic and eternal but also questions 
crude assumptions that it is simply an invented construct of the modernist state which 
might serve a function for a time before being self-consciously ditched in favour of a 
more suitable construction for a post-state era. This presents a challenge for notions 
that we are moving beyond public law. If the nation is not just constructed, does it 
merely serve the state? Or does to some extent the state also serve the nation, 
providing a set of institutions which allows it to set its own priorities, and represent its 
own identity? If the latter, mixed account, is more accurate, then we need to think 
about how the contemporary functionalism of public law comes to facilitate a still 
important, albeit in some ways and some cases changing, relationship between state 
and nation, a relationship which we should not be too hasty to assume has run its 
course. 
 
IV. The Changing Functionalism of Statal Public Law 
 
National identity is generally agreed, at least by all but the most extreme ethno-
nationalists, to be partly functional. In today’s condition of global normative flux 
therefore we need to take stock in order to ask what role it has played, and how might 
this role be changing as we see the functions of public law within the state also 
develop. In the remainder of the chapter I will consider empirical evidence which 
seems to suggest that both the nation and the state, in mutually supportive ways, retain 
considerable resilience today. 
 
The resilience of the nation 
 
The 20
th
 century expectation that the nation as a focus for people’s public identities 
would wane was in large part the consequence of eliding an ought with an is. It was 
hoped the nation would diminish and in part expectations were built upon this. A very 
understandable reason for this aspiration was the loss of moral capital the nation 
suffered particularly in the early part of that century through its association with the 
much corrupted currency of nationalism.
18
  Indeed the sense that the nation and in 
                                                        
16 L Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 
1992). 
17 B Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1991). 
18 A common assumption left by the bitter ethnic hatreds of the last century posits nationalism and 
liberalism as inherently incompatible. F A Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1960) 14–15; H Arendt, On Revolution (London, Penguin, 1963) 163; D Miller, On 
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particular nationalism as an ideology, or more accurately as a mode of structuring 
public identities, was increasingly revanchist and out-moded was one of the few 
commitments shared by both models of cosmopolitanism – liberal and Marxist - 
during the Cold War, albeit each informed by very different ideological 
presuppositions. 
 
But this has not proven to be the case. We can point to several pieces of evidence that 
suggest national attachments have not disappeared and indeed remain strong, even in 
Europe. If it is the case that the state is losing much of its purchase as exclusive site 
for normative control (and I will return to and in some respects contest this point 
below), it is a curious trend that the nation remains strong as the primary site of 
identity and loyalty for citizens and that in some respects it seems to be enjoying 
something of a renaissance. Many have expected European integration to lead 
inevitably to a redrawing of popular attachments with the prospect of a newly 
emerging polity that promises to replace the divisive, polarising and historically 
contingent nations of the continent. But it is clear national attachments have not 
dissipated, even in ‘EU’rope. 
 
Another factor has been the emergence of national identity as a key player in the 
collapse of the USSR and SFRY. There were of course complex political dynamics at 
work as these states dissolved, including popular revolt against oppressive 
governments, but the strength of national feeling expressed in so many republics and 
reiterated in overwhelming referendum turnout and votes for independence cannot be 
denied.
19
 This also extended to national reawakening in the Soviet satellite states of 
Eastern Europe. And we continue to see situations where subordinate peoples have 
retained an attachment to their own national community and an aspiration for self-
determination, even in the face of overwhelming oppression. This is evident in the 
recent moves towards independence by Montenegro and Kosovo
20
, recent and 
ongoing acts of decolonisation in East Timor and New Caledonia respectively, the 
emergence of Eritrea and Southern Sudan as states, and the struggles of the 
Palestinian people and the Sahrawis of Western Sahara for statehood. 
  
While again, as in the post-communist era, it might be argued that these developments 
have more to do with resisting oppression than nationalism, another, and for many a 
perplexing phenomenon, has been the resilience and indeed strengthening of national 
identities among sub-state regions within relatively prosperous and harmonious states 
such as the UK, Canada, Belgium and Spain. Although this phenomenon has led to 
strong autonomy regimes for sub-state nations, perhaps paradoxically this institutional 
accommodation has in some cases at least not quelled the political and constitutional 
aspirations for greater accommodation and has perhaps re-energised political 
nationalism within certain territories.
21
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Nationality (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995); M Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic 
War and the Modern Conscience (New York, Metropolitan Books, 1998); T Franck, The Empowered 
Self: Law and Society in the Age of Individualism (Oxford, OUP, 1999). 
19 S Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation 
(Oxford, OUP, 2012), … - …. 
20 S Tierney, ‘The Long Intervention in Kosovo: a Self-Determination Imperative?’, James Summers 
ed., Kosovo and International Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) 249-278. 
21 The respective levels of sub-state national identity and its connection to aspirations for independence 
is uneven from one territory to another. For example, the sovereignty movement in Quebec is currently 
weak, whereas in Scotland it has strengthened in recent years.  
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We also see on the international plane a proliferation of instruments designed to 
protect minorities, minority languages etc. The national identities of sub-state peoples 
who have no realistic opportunity or desire for statehood or for territorial transfer to a 
kin state remains strong, and the accommodation of these identities remains an issue 
for international law both at general
22
 and regional levels.
23
 These regimes are at an 
early stage of development and remain weak. But time will tell if they help foster 
nationalist claims in the developing world where sub-state national groups are now 
beginning to advance claims to territorial accommodation similar to those in Canada 
and Western Europe.
24
  
 
Another phenomenon we have seen is the spread of direct democracy as a means of 
settling major constitutional issues including sovereignty matters, which has provided 
a real instantiation of the connection between sovereignty as power and sovereignty as 
democratic legitimacy. The rise of the referendum within the modern democratic state 
has many causes and offers many implications for the functioning of representative 
government, but one consequence which is particularly relevant for this chapter is the 
way in which the referendum provides colonised, subordinate and minority nations 
with a vehicle to voice their discrete national identities and aspirations. We see this in 
the key role the referendum has played in leading to independent statehood in Eastern 
Europe, in East Timor, Eritrea and in Southern Sudan, and in constitution building in 
Iraq and elsewhere. It is also notable how the international community has fostered 
the referendum to facilitate expressions of national self-determination in recent years, 
and in a way that was not deployed in the earlier self-determination processes of 1919 
and the 1950s-1960s. This is partly through the hands-on engagement in particular 
peace-making or constitution-building processes (Eritrea 1993, Iraq 2005, 
Montenegro 2006 and South Sudan 2011) and partly through more general processes 
of norm creation through the issuing of guidelines e.g. by the Council of Europe’s 
Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission).
25
 Referendums  
have also been used in moves towards  national autonomy in Spain and the UK, and it 
is no surprise that nationalists in these territories and in Quebec have attempted or are 
now attempting to stage their own referendums on independence, sovereignty etc.  
 
There is also evidence that these referendums can be nation-affirming if not directly 
nation-building; in other words, the direct manifestation of a people in an act of 
collective self-determination is not only a constitutional moment, it is a national 
moment. National identity if it means anything constitutes the ongoing imagined 
collective consciousness of a nation’s members. It is the lived attachment of a group 
of people in the same polity specifically to one another, and it is consolidated not only 
                                                        
22  United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities; UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (adopted 14 September 
2007). 
23 Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; OSCE Copenhagen Document of 1990. 
24 W Kymlicka and M Opalski eds., Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and 
Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe (Oxford, OUP, 2002); B Berman, D Eyoh, and W Kymlicka eds. 
Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa, (James Currey Publishers and Ohio University Press, 2004); W 
Kymlicka and B He eds., Multiculturalism in Asia (Oxford, OUP, 2005); J Castellino and E 
Dominguez Redondo, Minority Rights in Asia (Oxford, OUP 2006). 
25 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) Code of Good Practice 
on Referendums, CDL-AD (2007) 008 rev, Council of Europe Strasbourg, 20 January 2009. 
Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2013/09 
Page 9 of 15 
 
through the everyday plebiscite of a shared and lived political experience, but also and 
increasingly by ‘every so often plebiscites’, i.e. real acts of collective, popular 
deliberation concluded at the ballot box. One paradox here is the use of referendums 
on EU integration, which perhaps threaten to have the opposite of the effect 
intended.
26
 Citizens from discrete nations come together in an act of popular 
sovereignty but the issue at stake is the transfer part of that sovereignty to a 
supranational body. And what we see from these processes is that not only does the 
nexus between state and popular legitimacy remain strong but so too do national 
attachments in Europe. To take Ireland for example, referendums have been used for 
all of the significant treaty processes. And it has been a bumpy ride, with evidence 
that over time Euroscepticism has steadily been growing.
27
 This can be seen in the 
rise of the No vote: 17% on accession in 1972; 30% in 1987 (Single European Act); 
31% in 1992 on the Treaty of European Union; 38% in 1998 on the Amsterdam 
Treaty; and finally rejection of the Treaty of Nice in 2001. Following a minor 
concession by way of the Seville Declaration recognising Ireland's policy of military 
neutrality, a second referendum was held and the Nice Treaty was eventually accepted 
by Irish voters in 2002. But the more dramatic rejection was that of the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2008, intensifying as it did the shockwaves still reverberating from the 
failure of the draft Constitutional Treaty. Once again the Irish government negotiated 
minor compromises and Lisbon was eventually accepted by the Irish people in 2009. 
The popular rebellions against both the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty in 
states where referendums were held seem to bear this out.
28
  
 
There remains the question, however, whether the opprobrium heaped upon 
nationalism is not having an effect. The image of nationalism we were left with after 
the age of Fascism and National Socialism should surely have diminished nationalism 
and national identity in an age when liberalism with its cosmopolitan aspirations hold 
sway.
29
 But in fact what we have seen is that the revival of national identity in the past 
few decades has brought with it a new turn in scholarship which calls into question 
the 20
th
 century stereotype of the nation as backward and out-dated. This new work 
across a range of disciplines questions the caricature of the nation and national 
identity as undemocratic, dangerous and unfit for purpose in an age of state 
transformation. 
 
We saw the first challenge to the stereotype in the work of sociologists who have 
since the 1960s demonstrated the resilience of national identity and surprisingly the 
strengthening of it particularly at the sub-state level within democratic, liberal, 
                                                        
26 M Shu ‘Referendums and the Political Constitutionalisation of the EU’ (2008) 14 European Law 
Journal 423. 
27
 J O’ Brennan, Ireland says No (again): the 12 June 2008 Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, 
Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 62 No. 2, 2009, 258–277, 274.  
28 Qvortrup on the first Irish Lisbon referendum concluded that ‘the voters, while not opposed to the 
EU as such, were unhappy with further integration or transfer of sovereignty.’ M Qvortrup, ‘Rebels 
without a Cause? The Irish Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty’, (2009) 80 Political Quarterly 59-66, 
65. Schuck and De Vreese are among those who consider Euroscepticism among the Dutch electorate 
to be a more significant factor behind the No vote on the Reform Treaty than domestic, second order 
issues: A Schuck and C De Vreese, ‘The Dutch No to the EU Constitution: Assessing the Role of EU 
Skepticism and the Campaign’, (2008) 18 Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties 101-128, 
120; R Sinnott, ‘Attitudes and Behaviour of the Irish Electorate in the Referendum on the Treaty of 
Nice’ (2003) University of College Dublin Working Papers 
<http://www.ucd.ie/dempart/workingpapers/nice2.pdf> accessed 10 October 2011. 
29 T. Franck op. cit. 
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tolerant states. Sociologists have found national identities to be resilient, but they have 
also found them not to be particularly thick with markers of membership based 
decreasingly on ethnic markers and more on civic models of belonging.
30
 They have 
also found that national identity remains strong even as cultural distinctions within 
multinational states and around the world seem to diminish in an era of 
cosmopolitanism.
31
 
 
Secondly, political scientists have addressed the constitutional aspirations of this new 
nationalism and found, contrary to many expectations, that political actors adopting 
the nationalist mantle are for the most part not backward-looking or reactionary, but 
espouse values wholly consistent with the plurality of opinion in modern, Western 
societies, for example on issues such as social welfare, citizenship and human rights.
32
 
Furthermore, they have advanced political programmes that run largely with the grain 
of changing state power, supra-state integration, and internationalisation of previously 
monopolistic state functions; nationalists in Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec situate 
themselves within the context of their respective integrating continents in ways 
similar to state nationalists, and in some ways are in fact more pro-integrationist.
33
 In 
other words, the new nationalism was found to fit wholly consistently within the 
‘progressive’ trend of modern politics, weakening the negative stereotype with which 
nationalism has been tarnished. 
 
And thirdly we find in political theory, including perhaps surprisingly liberal political 
theory, a subtle turn that has served to question the notion that nationalism and 
liberalism are inherently incompatible. Rather political philosophers, most 
comprehensively Will Kymlicka, have found the aspirations of these national groups 
to be wholly consistent with liberalism and have in fact argued that liberalism has a 
duty to accommodate these political and constitutional aspirations if it is to be true to 
its own values of liberty and equality.
34
 It is only in the context of individual people’s 
societal culture that they can advance their own life goals in a fulfilled way, achieving 
the liberal goals of equality and liberty.
35
 
 
Therefore, just as in empirical terms national identity has shown itself to remain 
strong, within the social sciences there is considerable evidence that it is also 
                                                        
30 D McCrone, Understanding Scotland: The sociology of a nation, 2nd edn. (London, Routledge, 
2001). 
31 The ever closer alignment of values among nations within states at the same time as nationalist 
sentiment within these nations grows has been called ‘de Tocqueville’s paradox’ by Stephane Dion. S. 
Dion, ‘Le nationalisme dans la convergence culturelle: le Québec contemporain et le paradoxe de 
Tocqueville’, in R. Hudon and R. Pelletier, (eds) L'engagement intellectuel : Mélange en l'honneur de 
Léon Dion (Québec, Presses de l'Université Laval, 1991). 
32 M Keating, Nations Against the State – The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and 
Scotland, 2nd edn. (UK, Palgrave, 2001); A-G Gagnon & J Tully (eds) Multinational Democracies 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
33 M Keating, Plurinational Democracy: stateless nations in a post-sovereignty era (Oxford, OUP, 
2001).  
34 W Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1995); 
M Moore, ‘Normative Justifications for Liberal Nationalism: justice, democracy and national identity’, 
(2001) 7 Nations and Nationalism 1-20; F. Requejo (ed) Democracy and National Pluralism (London, 
Routledge, 2001). 
35 W Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular (Oxford, OUP, 2001); S Tierney, ‘The Search for a New 
Normativity: Thomas Franck, Post-Modern Neo-Tribalism and the Law of Self-Determination’ (2002) 
European Journal of International Law 941-960. 
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adaptable, and can remain fit for purpose in an internationalising world. And if it is 
the case that national identities remain resilient, with people finding primary identity 
in their societal cultures, while open to the opportunities a cosmopolitanising world 
has to offer, what of the state? 
 
The resilience of the state 
 
Here again rumours of the state’s demise seem to be over-stated. The resilience of the 
nation and national identity cannot be detached from the ongoing functional role of 
the state, and ‘statal public law’ is still required to service this nexus. 
 
We do of course need to observe that the normative order in which states exist has 
changed greatly; the state is no longer the exclusive resource through which public 
power is facilitated and restrained. In Europe with its particularly sophisticated 
supranational apparatus there is no doubt that the particular manifestation of European 
public law, to facilitate the monopolistic public power of the sovereign state is 
changing. But from a European perspective it is easy to develop a skewed outlook and 
miss how strong the state is in other parts of the world. The state has not disappeared; 
arguably it remains strong even in Europe. And more broadly its function within the 
international legal environment remains crucial and pre-eminent. 
  
Supranationalism and its diffusion 
 
There are a number of ways in which we can re-emphasise the ongoing importance of 
the state. One is to observe that the proliferation of normative sites beyond the state in 
some ways, and perhaps paradoxically, reinforces the state’s importance. Both the 
international community and the state in its dealings with it have become more 
porous, open to new actors, developing more accessible and in some ways transparent 
processes, and developing in turn new horizontal (state to state and non-state actor to 
non-state actor) and vertical (state to supranational institution and non-state actor to 
supranational institution) dynamics. Given this connection between the emergence of 
institutions which seem in some light to form the origins of a proto-global governance 
matrix we cannot conceive of these communities of states and the communities of 
non-state actors as somehow separable, particularly since individuals, NGOs and 
political movements within this ‘supranational civil society’ are increasingly able to 
access, and are structured in order best to influence, the communities of states and 
supranational institutions. 
 
However, it may also be observed that this increasingly diverse set of relations makes 
the idea of a unified, central system of global government a less rather than a more 
realistic prospect. With the multiplication of institutions, agents and processes comes 
a wider diversification of sites of authority and a less clear hierarchical structure 
among actors within these sites and across normative sites themselves, giving the 
impression of ‘governance without government’.36 Recent normative clashes in cases 
such as Kadi
37
 hint at a possible ‘chaos theory’. In particular it is not clear how, if at 
all, the increasing interaction of and competition among international organisations 
                                                        
36 KE Jorgensen and B Rosamund, ‘Europe: a regional laboratory for a global polity?’ in R Higgott and 
M Ougaard eds Towards a Global Polity (London, Routledge, 2000) 189-206. 
37 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union 
and Commission of the European Communities (2005) E.C.R. II-3649. 
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and treaty bodies affects the simple architecture of  the UN and its commitment to the 
equality of sovereign states.  
Even the most advanced model of supranationalism, the EU, presents a very mixed 
picture of the prospects for macro-constitutional architecture beyond the state.
38
 
Certainly it seems to offer at least the beginnings of some type of transnational 
community of individuals, or even a proto-form of state itself. But if this is the 
ultimate goal, there remain considerable political and constitutional obstacles facing 
such supranational state-building projects which did not confront the first modernist 
wave of nation-building in the late 18
th
-19
th
 centuries.  
The end of coercive nation-building 
 
It should not be over-looked that the Westphalian order was built largely by coercion. 
18
th
 and 19
th
 century (as well as post-colonial) nation-building was often imposed 
from on top with no democratic political traditions in place to generate resistance. 
State-building elites had a much freer hand in over-riding the niceties of pluralism, 
respect for national minorities, linguistic diversity etc.
 
than governments today which 
are generally dependent upon popular consent. It is difficult to see how new 
normative orders can deploy such an aggressive approach, at least directly. There are 
attempts of course, such as the refusal to take No for an answer in the empire-building 
referendums of the EU. But on the other hand the recent referendums in Ireland, 
France and the Netherlands show that the political and at some level consensual road 
to integration will only allow such a top-down approach to proceed so far. And with 
the referendum a stronger part of many constitutions the future road to further 
integration looks potentially rocky. Another possible avenue is economic dependence. 
We have seen how the recent economic crisis in Greece and the danger this poses to 
the Euro has led powerful actors within the EU to move for further political 
integration as a way of exerting further economic control throughout the Eurozone. 
Also the new nation-states of the post-enlightenment period often replaced antiquated, 
undemocratic relics of feudalism, and so the normative argument for the new, proto-
democratic state was more easily made (where it even had to be) in cases of 
imposition. Also other new nations were born from popular revolutions and grew a 
new national identity from this fertile solid. But today the supra-nation or supra-state 
entities seek a place alongside or in place of often well-established and reasonably 
contented national democracies. And so the attractiveness of supra-state centralisation 
is often less than self-evident from a democratic perspective.
39
 Although earlier 
periods of nation-building were often taken to be politically progressive, and as such 
they attracted political support across the political spectrum, this is not always the 
case with globalisation or further integration in Europe, each of which face popular 
opposition at the vernacular and even cosmopolitan levels, from left and right. A 
recent example again is the left wing backlash against the economic austerity imposed 
upon Greece by the European Union. 
                                                        
38 JHH Weiler and M Wind, European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge, CUP, 2003). 
39 It is also notable that post-war decolonisation movements when they sought to centralise power were 
often unsuccessful. Many secessionist movements quickly developed resulting in bloody civil wars, 
and almost every post-colonial federation constructed in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean before 
independence collapsed into their constituent ex-colonial parts soon afterwards. As Jackson notes: 
‘Societas Europe and not federalist America was the wave of the future almost everywhere in the world 
after 1945.’ R Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford, OUP, 
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Finally, in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries warfare played a huge part in uniting disparate 
communities within the state in order to resist external threats; there was no shortage 
of regional enemies who provided a ready-made source for a new patriotism; the 
development of militaristic Prussian nationalism as a vital resource in forging 19
th
 
century German identity is a good example. We await to see whether attempts to 
construct elaborate supranational governmental structures such as a deeper EU will in 
time seek to harness a defensive mentality in relation to the outside or aggressiveness 
and the instillation of an ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality. This has not been particularly 
evident hitherto although the hardening of a western, liberal, civic European identity 
in the face of Islamic extremism or even internal dissent may provide one analogous, 
and unfortunate, context for the development of a nascent European supranational 
identity.
40
  
International law and the pre-eminence of the state 
 
Moving beyond the EU arena, one of the consequences of a ‘EU’ro-centric 
perspective is that we can overlook the fact that under international law the state still 
retains unrivalled privileges and that a number of sub-state peoples aspire to join the 
club of states. Certainly the number of states is increasing as we see in recent times 
with the emergence of Montenegro and the other recent states mentioned earlier. It 
also seems to be getting easier to become a new state. Kosovo’s seemingly inevitable 
move to statehood may well set a precedent that was not anticipated by the tight rules 
on decolonisation or by the uti possidetis rule as applied by the EC Guidelines on 
Recognition for the former Yugoslavia.
41
 It remains to be seen how other territories 
will try to apply the Kosovo case in the making of sovereignty claims. 
 
At the level of privileges we should not overlook the resilience of the external 
dimension of state sovereignty. States retain a monopoly of control on the law-making 
process within international law. And crucially a monopoly also over the rules of 
membership. Very few new members of the club emerge without prior international 
authorisation. New states have tended to have their access mediated through well-
regulated channels of recognition, external oversight etc. Even Kosovo enjoys 
authorisation of sorts, by virtue of the delay in determining final status under Security 
Council Resolution 1244 which, by being overtaken by events on the ground, led in 
the end to a fait accompli, and one which the great powers could be said to have 
facilitated indirectly by their ambiguous attitude to Kosovan statehood since the draft 
Rambouillet Accord in 1999. 
 
Another privilege is that states retain very high levels of autonomy in treaty-making. 
Much is made of the roles of new actors in law-making processes, but in fact states 
enjoy an overwhelming monopoly in these processes with the access of NGOs to such 
processes limited and highly attenuated.
42
 Even when offered the highest levels of 
involvement – e.g. within the drafting council that led to the Statute of the ICC – 
NGOs still lacked any voting power. Even the EU treaty process largely follows the 
international principle of the sovereign equality of states. Also non-state entities do 
not in general have personality before international tribunals etc. And the state 
                                                        
40 S Tierney, ‘Rights versus Democracy? The Bill of Rights in Plurinational States’, in C Harvey and A 
Schwartz, eds., Bills of Rights in Divided Societies (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012), … … 
41 J Summers ed., Kosovo and International Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2011). 
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remains the only viable institution to which to ascribe responsibility; in other words it 
is to the state and the state alone that actors must turn for the enforcement of 
international obligations. 
 
It is also notable that the sovereignty of a particular state cannot be terminated. Its 
functional use may decline or elements of it be surrendered as they have in the EU, 
but the state’s lawful competence cannot be forcibly removed. We see this when we 
reflect that although many new states have been created since 1945 very few have 
disappeared. Another way in which state existence is guaranteed is through 
prohibition of the use of force. It is very difficult for states to use force against other 
states without facing international opprobrium. Even when they seek to secure 
Security Council authorisation this is difficult as we saw ahead of the invasion of Iraq, 
and the level of criticism faced by the USA and UK over this conflict must surely act 
as a deterrent. Ironically it would seem that the Security Council has been 
strengthened through its refusal to endorse this action, even though the action went 
ahead anyway. This is another aspect of the growth of democratisation. Just as it is 
more difficult to forge a nation internally by coercion, so too is it more difficult to 
forge internationalism of empire externally by conquest. 
 
It should also be noted that although the government of Iraq was overthrown Iraq 
itself has not disappeared. A term that has entered the international relations 
vocabulary in recent times is ‘failed state’. But this is a misnomer; states don’t fail, 
governments and institutions do. Indeed it is testimony to state resilience that 
pathological political situations in recent years that have overtaken Rwanda, Cote 
D’Ivoire, Liberia etc. have not led to state collapse.  
 
It is therefore important to restate that international law still massively prioritises the 
state – nation nexus. And although individual human rights is expanding, the 
enforcement of these is highly variable from region to region, and in many respects 
still depends upon the filter of state consent.
43
 We should also note how weakly 
international law protects minority rights both within Art 27 ICCPR which offers so 
many concessions to state power, and to the very general and non-prescriptive terms 
of specific instruments on minority rights. International law may become a greater 
focus for disgruntled minorities in the coming decades in attempts to go behind the 
veil of statehood, but for now the state and its dominant nation are the key players in 
the international arena. And indeed the lesson for minorities seems to be – become a 
state if you want international status, do not wait for either the end of statehood or 
international recognition of regional government.
44
 
 
V. The changing functionalism of the nation 
 
The state is still with us and so is the nation, and it seems that each continues to feed 
on the vitality of the other. But this is also a complex, symbiotic and mutually 
reinforcing relationship. Public law in its modernist functionalism as the resource that 
has managed and sustained this relationship is therefore more than alive. Insofar as 
the state’s role is changing, and in some cases that role is diminishing as it is in 
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Europe, public law is changing its environment. In other words, it is exercising the 
function of managing public power in new and diverse ways across multiple sites. In 
this sense it is analogous to energy in the natural world, it can change its state but 
does not disappear. 
 
The bigger story is that we can be distracted by the tale of globalisation and even of 
privatisation. The state too is adapting to change as it always has. We are reminded of 
Carr’s comment: ‘We nod approvingly today when someone tells us that, whereas the 
State used to be merely policeman, judge and protector, it has now become 
schoolmaster, doctor, house-builder, road-maker, town-planner, public utility supplier 
and all the rest of it.’45 Some of these functions change, but the state today, even in 
Europe, retains functions considerably stronger than those exercised one hundred 
years ago, including additional regulatory functions it did not exercise even in Carr’s 
time. And some states are getting stronger; there is a renewed vitality in large states in 
particular.
46
 And so it should perhaps be no surprise that sub-state national groups 
recognise the inherent privileges states possess. Indeed there is perhaps no stronger 
indication of the state’s strength than the appetite among sub-state peoples to create 
new ones and the fact that once created states rarely disappear. 
 
And in this sense resilient too is the nation. National attachments remain strong, the 
past forty years has seen the re-emergence of nascent national identities and their 
consolidation, even as cultural markers of distinction seem to diminish. The key 
seems to be legitimacy, and in particular the democratic imperative which is also 
spreading at the same time as the world globalises. Economic forces may undermine 
some functions of the state, but it does remain the only vehicle that hosts popular 
government; and it is in this function, offering vernacular legitimacy for government, 
that the state retains its strength. And public law which has been developed in such 
subtle ways over the past century, crafting institutions that both facilitate and restrain 
the popular will of the people, remains central to our understanding of the public 
space. The function of modern constitutionalism is to serve the democratic 
relationship between the state and the nation, and while both are with us as they 
assuredly still are, so too will be public law. 
 
 
                                                        
45 C. Carr, Concerning English Administrative Law (Oxford, OUP, 1941) 10–11. 
46 ‘one expects an Asia-dominated international law to emphasize traditional concerns of sovereignty, 
non-interference, and mutual cooperation rather than the constitutionalist vision of supranational 
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